Introduction
This essay examines the role of expertise in the public debate on creative industries policy in the United Kingdom. Think tanks have been prominent in this. However, in the extensive literature on British think tanks, their relations with the fields of media, culture and communications have been completely neglected. This is a strange omission, given the centrality of these fields to public life -and not least, to the polity and economy.
As well as addressing questions in public policy analysis, this article also contributes to the sociology of the intellectuals. It is the politico-intellectual field in which think tanks are situated -between universities and the political institutions. In that location, the connections between think tanks and news media (as well as the political system) are key because some key think tank players are also 'media intellectuals'. The practice of think 2 tankery is above all about the mediation of ideas, and their brokerage in the public domain, with intended policy effects.
We may argue, therefore, that think tanks -as producers of reproducible mediated discourse -are themselves part of a wider communications industry. Indeed, their personnel often gravitate towards the world of communications and cultural policy, andnot infrequently -they have various kinds of media background. Elsewhere (Schlesinger and Tumber 1994; Schlesinger et al. 2001) , I have shown how news reporting is deeply enmeshed in the strategic action of sources as part of a wider argument against taking an exclusively 'media-centric' focus. The present analysis extends the examination of sources' strategic action beyond the more usual focus on government, major institutions, enterprises and social movements to the think tanks themselves -which may (and usually do) have a variety of connections with each of the foregoing.
Three main themes are addressed. First, some key historical moments in the evolution of think tanks in the UK in the wider context of the sociology of intellectuals. Second, that broader sociology is related to the 'policy generation' at the heart of New Labour in power, [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . Third, a case study of policy making is presented, showing how think tanks -and other forms of expertise -may contribute to the shaping of the policy process. The present focus on the struggle for power and influence of ideas-producers in the marketplace underlines the continued relevance of ideology (and therefore of ideology critique) for contemporary cultural analysis (Downey 2008) . And while we limit ourselves here to the peculiarities of the British, this study suggests a theme for the comparative analysis of policy expertise (cf. Stone and Denham (eds) 2004 ).
I shall focus on the development of creative industries policy. Since the Labour Party came to power in 1997 ideas brokerage has turned this into a broader discourse on the 'creative economy'. These terms mark the difference between considering selected industrial sectors as constituting special objects of a common policy and regarding 'creativity' as a fundamental shaping force for the entire economy.
Think tanks in the UK
The workings of think tanks -along with policy specialists in government, consultants, and lobbyists in the wider 'policy community' -may be analysed in terms of a sociology of knowledge and intellectuals in the present phase of modernity. Think tanks are not easily defined although an extensive literature attempts to offer viable categorisations.
For present purposes, I take think tanks to be organisations that describe themselves as such and which are engaged in the production of policy discourses that make claims to knowledge. Those who work in think tanks, as policy advisers or consultants, are a tiny and select segment of the university-educated intelligentsia. They operate within elite circles where the costs of entry to knowledgeable policy discussion are high. Their exclusivity -or as Pierre Bourdieu (1986) would put it, their 'distinction' is based in the claims to expertise made by the thinktankerati.
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In a major study of British think tanks, Diane Stone (1996) suggests that these be seen as 'independent policy research institutes'. Whether they are 'independent' is a matter of empirical judgement. For as Stone notes, the line between 'policy analysis and advocacy does get blurred ' (1996:13) , not least because think tanks engage in 'building networks within policy communities and tailoring their product to the needs of decision makers and opinion leaders ' (1996: 23) . Stone argues that think tanks occupy a strategic position in the 'epistemic communities' in which knowledge about policy is debated. Such 'knowledge based networks … articulate the cause-and-effect relationships of complex problems ' (1996: 37) . Because think tanks operate within a highly structured market place for ideas, marketing and promotion are central to their quest for influence over government. Consequently, their ability to achieve resonance within the media is of central importance; they are a major resource for journalists (1996: 71).
Stone suggests that we conceive of think tanks as having 'influence' rather than a direct impact on policy formulation; she argues plausibly that they have changed how policy is 'debated and decided' and that 'they help to provide the conceptual language, the ruling paradigms, the empirical examples that become the accepted assumptions for those in charge of making policy ' (1996: 110) .
Indeed, we can go beyond this to note that the terms of the discourse may become so compelling that not to buy into these is tantamount to self-exclusion (Schlesinger 2007) .
If those in charge of policy sing from their own hymn sheet, those who want policy to work for them are obliged to join the congregation in full voice. This is demonstrably the 5 case in the debate over 'creativity' that has dominated thinking about the cultural industries for more than a decade in the UK and which has increasingly been exported elsewhere by its exponents.
Expertise and government
Michael Schudson (2006: 499) has characterised an expert as 'someone in possession of specialized knowledge that is accepted by the wider society as legitimate…What defines an expert as a sociological type is willingness to submit to the authority of a group of peers.' Contrary to those who see expertise as a threat to democracy, Schudson (2006: 500-501) sees it -ideally -as speaking truth to power, clarifying the grounds of public debate, and offering a diagnostic service.
Schudson's optimism needs to be tempered somewhat. The costs of entry to expertise create barriers between those with know-how and those without it. Experts advising those in power may lose their critical, democratic edge when faced by the seduction of power and influence. Furthermore, an educated public may not be able to muster the requisite arguments in forms capable of counterbalancing insider know-how. In short, being able to take one's critical distance from expertise does still matter, given the continuing -and indeed, growing -importance of expert knowledge for the policy process.
Think tanks, arguably, helped create the climate of ideas that aided the rise to power in the United Kingdom of Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1979 (Collini 2006: 194) . In reaction to Thatcherism's ideologues, the New Labour opposition prepared 6 for the end of its seventeen-year exile from the levers of government by encouraging the growth of its own think tanks. Think tank formation and re-orientation is a lead indicator of impending political change.
Contemporary policy expertise is deeply connected with modern party politics. As Rod Eyerman (1994: 106ff) (Denham and Garnett 1998) , arguably they inflected both the political discourse and shaped the intellectual terrain. Leftoriented analyses, such as the 'New Times' arguments elaborated during the 1980s in left-wing monthly Marxism Today, were deeply influenced by Antonio Gramsci's 7 conception of the struggle for hegemony. The issue was how to make both discursive and institutional responses to the prevalent neo-liberalism (Desai 1994) . The goal of recapturing the 'nation' as a discursive object, the celebration of popular culture and the drive for constitutional reform came out of this moment (Hall and Jacques 1989) .
Colin Leys (2006) has argued that given regimes provide key background conditions for understanding how expertise is mobilised and articulated. Thus, in liberal/social democracies, a generalist civil service may call upon various kinds of public inquiry to provide external advice. Leys holds that state interventionism engendered the development of research departments and policy centres and a shared commitment to objectivity 'in the sense that policy proposals should be judged on the basis of rational argument and sound evidence ' (2006: 3) . The public domain is one in which 'professionals' hold sway. Post 1974, monetarist thinking dominated during the global financial crisis and there was a marked shift to a neo-liberal policy regime. 'Its key feature,' argues Leys, 'is that policy is now fundamentally about national competitiveness and responding to global market forces ' (2006: 2) . Private sector secondments to government, special advisers and communications experts displaced the career civil service, which has been 'radically reorganised on business lines, following the doctrines of the "new public management" '(2006: 5) . According to this argument, more policymaking opportunities have been created for the thinktankerati and other experts. For Leys, the new ideal type is the entrepreneur rather than the rational Weberian bureaucrat 'the impetus for establishing the IPPR came out of the need to recreate a modernising left-wing intellectual community, able to suggest new policies to solve problems caused or ignored by free marketeers, without alienating a moderate electorate' (Ruben 1996: 66) . Patricia Hewitt (b1948), previously director of Liberty (the civil liberties lobbying group), was IPPR's deputy director from 1989-94 and said to be the organisation's driving force.
ii Hewitt had earlier been press secretary for Labour Party leader Neil
Kinnock from 1988-89 (Ruben 1996: 67) (Bale 1996: 23) . In its heyday, Demos was seen as having an 'effective media presence' with access to the opinion-forming quality press that 'would make the average university social scientist more than envious' (Bale 1996: 29, 31 Mulgan has argued that 'parties are now more clearly defined as users rather than generators of ideas' (Mulgan 1996: 94 ; emphasis added). He has deemed both the universities and the civil service to lack policy firepower. Consequently, Mulgan (1996: 96) suggests, 'straddling institutions' such as think tanks, consultants and major accountancy firms have become key advisors in government reform and public sector restructuring. Think tanks, Mulgan maintains, have secured a position in 'intellectual arbitrage': 'Successful and rising think tanks can convert political access into money, money into ideas, and ideas into legitimacy, and by doing so they can attract ambitious contributors' (Mulgan 2006: 148) .
And indeed, access is key. The public face of thinktankery is concerned with airing ideas, in particular through media coverage. A much more discreet exercise of think tank influence lies in an ability to attract ministers and other key policy makers into seminars, thereby seeking to shape the terms of debate and provide personnel to advise on policy formation.
Expertise may also be gained by working in the policy machinery of a major showing how it has acquired the look of an increasingly closed ideological system (Schlesinger 2007) . In what follows, drawing on interviews with policy insiders, I shift the focus to the production of creative industries discourse and the use of various kinds of expertise to underpin ministerial needs for a policy 'narrative'. I shall also illustrate how outside expertise may become subject to the stratagems of bureaucratic politics.
Launching creative industries policy
The UK government appears to have pioneered the idea of the creative industries in a These have been taken to include the following key sectors: advertising, architecture, the art and antiques market, crafts, design, designer fashion, film, interactive leisure software, music, the performing arts, publishing, software and television and radio.' (DCMS 1998: 3) Despite the more recent development of arguments about the 'creative economy', the thirteen sectors identified in 1998 remain an obligatory point of departure for debate in the UK and further afield.
From the start, the logic of economic policy has prevailed. The core purpose of the Task Force set up by the DCMS was 'to recommend steps to maximise the economic impact of the UK creative industries at home and abroad' (ibid).
The Task Force's membership included representatives of 13 government departments or public bodies. Nine prominent 'industry advisers' came from publishing, music, advertising, design, television and film (DCMS 1998: 4) . Creativity policy became a national project, 'branding' the UK as at the global cutting-edge. Two key policy nostrums have been in play from the beginning.
First, the UK is imagined as a competitive nation for which developing a 'knowledge economy' is key. Over the past decade, this line has become increasingly emphatic with the realisation that the 'BRIC' countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China), present an increasing threat to high-end 'creative' activities. Education and training and their articulation with the creative industries, therefore, have become key policy arenas.
Second, government intervention in the market, especially in establishing conditions that enhance company performance, is justified as helping to secure the knowledge base.
'Creativity' -like innovation -has become a generalised value in itself, still largely unquestioned. It is supposed to inform education at all levels and indeed, to become part of the warp and woof of organisational and personal life everywhere.
Towards a new paradigm
While creative industries policy enjoyed considerable attention at the start of Chris Smith's period as Secretary of State, it gradually lost prominence as other major policy issues began to dominate the agenda. As one of Smith's close collaborators noted: 'Chris was very determined to get that creative industry agenda going on a broader front than just the DCMS', although other departments lost interest quite quickly. these covered infrastructure, competition and intellectual property, access to finance and business support, education and skills, diversity, technology, and evidence and analysis.
Of especial interest is the rethinking of the original idea of the creative industries. Civil servants came to recognise -after a decade -that their own data were not robust enough for policy-making. They also came to acknowledge (at least implicitly) that the original 21 idea of the creative industries was too broad and needed refinement -for one, that it needed to be disaggregated, and secondly, that the policy building process had not been Alongside these analyses, the CEP mobilised several kinds of expertise. First, 'stakeholder' know-how was brought into six of the seven working groups. This echoed the practice of the first creative industries task forces. However, unlike its predecessors, which had conscripted prominent figures from the commercial and business worlds, the groups were overwhelmingly drawn from public sector bodies. In industry circles (and among some of those actually involved) this recruitment was seen as reducing the credibility of the exercise.
The CEP's working groups produced a series of interim reports. Some ideas were floated and then simply disappeared. Others survived in the circulatory system of policy making.
For example, the idea of a 'creative summit', branding London as the 'global hub for creativity', endured until publication of the DCMS's strategy document in February 2008.
The CEP was refocused once again when Purnell was moved to another department.
According to insiders, his replacement as Creative Industries Minister, Shaun Woodward, was very keen to make his mark. Woodward was unhappy with the outcomes achieved so far by the CEP working groups and wanted a new 'narrative'. This is typical of ministerial change: one government adviser pertinently described ministers as 'marketeers' engaged in 'marketing ideas to the public in order to win elections and they're marketing ideas to industry and officials to see them implemented'. In part, the Work Foundation had encountered a more general disenchantment with think tanks and consultants. One DCMS source reflected that after more than ten years in government:
'The gene pool is drying up a bit. We're at the third generation of people coming in from think tanks to be special advisers and half the Cabinet started off in think tanks and that means that the expertise inside government is such that there's less appetite to ask Will
Hutton to write a report.' xxi 26
To compound the difficulties, there had also been differences of view between the two key departments involved, the DCMS and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI, subsequently BERR). When the CEP began, the DTI had considered that much of it 'effectively' covered its own territory of 'support for small businesses, access to finance, regulation and competition…the heart of economic things for DTI to be very much actively engaged in and quite possibly leading on.' xxii The CEP therefore had to be a joint project. The DTI/BERR had insisted that it 'owned' software, whose economic impact The UK government's strategy paper -Creative Britain: New Talents for the New
Economy -certainly accorded with the dictates of practical politics rather than blue skies thinking. According to one key figure involved in the drafting, it was 'a significant step forward' by 'properly integrating education, training, skills and economic policy'.
However, it was conceded that the CEP had not established 'this sector of the economy as a real heavyweight player'. The Work Foundation had envisaged a radical new conception of an economy with creative activity at the core. What emerged instead was a plethora of stitched-together policy proposals already in the machinery of DIUS, BERR and the DCMS.
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Conclusions
Governments use various forms of expertise to fly kites and to inform the policy formation process. In a double movement, ministers both aim to secure their own legitimacy by seeking expert solutions and at the same time -when flying kites -to shift responsibility for new thinking outside the governmental machinery. Although we should be cautious in making inferences from just one case study, a number of characteristic features of the policy process may be identified. and Creative Britain (2008) to illustrate this point. Continual intra-governmental competition is hard to discern if we limit ourselves simply to reading the products of policy discourse which typically constitute a lattice-work of conformity to a small number of policy prescriptions underpinned by a belief system.
Third, at given moments in the life of a government, ministerial 'ownership' of policies is important for the focus achieved by particular areas of activity. As we have seen, such assertions of ownership may be for reasons of personal advancement or -more 29 honourably -because of a deep familiarity with a given area and a belief that it really matters.
Fourth, while in small departments such as the DCMS, officials may need outsiders to develop the broad lines of policy thinking, civil servants are also protective of their own space and in particular their own need to find workable and practical solutions that enable them to implement policy. The DCMS had to manage the scepticism about its initiatives that abounded in larger and more important ministries such as DIUS, DTI/BERR and the Treasury. Where work has been commissioned that doesn't quite fit the bill -as in the case of the Work Foundation's Staying Ahead -bringing in a trusted 'fixer' to rework the text is one option.
Last, there are intriguing hints in the account given above of how a policy field -and its underlying political generation may 'mature'. Some of those involved in policy advicewho began their careers in think tanks -have now taken their distance from them, and while they do not necessarily deny their origins, they may disparage their previous occupation from a position of insider influence. To put it differently, one form of expertise has made its necessary transition. The equivocal status of think tankery has been refined into practical political knowledge, embodied in ministers who have transcended their origins.
